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A BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF THE
COLORADO SPRINGS SPOUSE ABUSE
EXPERIMENT
RICHARD A. BERK, ALEC CAMPBELL, RUTH KLAP,

AND BRUCE WESTERN*
ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes data from the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse
Experiment. In that experiment, suspects apprehended for misdemeanor sFouse abuse were assigned at random to one of four treatments: (1) an emergency order of protection for the victim coupled
with arrest of the suspect; (2) an emergency order of protection for the
victim coupled with immediate crisis counseling for the suspect; (3) an
emergency order of protection only; or (4) restoring order at the scene
with no emergency order of protection. Outcome measures are taken
from official police data and from follow-up interviews with victims.
Using Bayesian procedures to take previous experiments into account,
the balance of evidence supports a deterrent effect for arrest among
"good risk" offenders, who presumably have a lot to lose by being
arrested. The balance of evidence is far more equivocal for a "labeling
effect" in which an arrest increases the likelihood of new violence.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The pioneering Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment was arguably one of the most influential and controversial criminal justice
studies conducted over the past several decades. In 1981 and 1982,
the Minneapolis Police department, in cooperation with the Police
Foundation and with the support of the National Institute of Justice,
conducted a randomized field experiment on the impact of three
Acknowledgement: We are indebted to Roderick Little for comments on an earlier
version of this Article paper and to the Colorado Springs Police Department for mounting the experiment and providing the data. Special thanks go to Howard Black and William Edmunds of the Colorado Springs Police Department for supervising the project.
The experiment was funded by the National Institute ofJustice. Points of view or opinions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official
views of the U.S. Department ofJustice or the Colorado Springs Police Department.
* All the authors are with the Department of Sociology, Program in Social Statistics,
University of California, Los Angeles.
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different intervention strategies in cases of misdemeanor spousal violence: (1) arresting the suspect; (2) ordering the suspect from the
premises for twenty-four hours; or (3) "simply" trying to restore order. Outcome measures were obtained from new offenses reported
to the police and from follow-up interviews with victims. The study
concluded that arresting the suspect was the most effective treatment in reducing the likelihood of renewed violence. 1
The findings of the experiment were immediately introduced
into the policy area. Soon after, a number of police departments
across the country made an arrest the presumptive intervention in
incidents of spousal violence. A number of states also revised their
penal codes to more seriously address spousal violence and the importance of sanctioning suspects. 2 Yet, there was also substantial
controversy. Policy makers' uncritical acceptance of the findings
3
from a single study caused major concern.
The researchers responsible for the reports of the Minneapolis
experiment stated clearly the limitations of a single study. For example, commenting on the impact of the arrest treatment, Berk and
Sherman note that "the effectiveness of arrest is relative to the other
treatments applied. If arrest were pitted against other interventions, or the same interventions implemented somewhat differently,
the results could change." 4
In response to these and other concerns, the National Institute
of Justice funded follow-up experiments at six new sites. An effort
was made to coordinate the follow-up studies and to replicate the
Minneapolis protocols as much as possible. To date, there are published results from only one of the replications. In Omaha, Nebraska, arrest did not stand out as the most effective intervention. 5
We will have more to say about that study shortly. Working papers
from at least one other site are being circulated. Here, we report
the first findings from the Colorado Springs, Colorado replication,
I Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrestfor
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261, 261 (1984); Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W.
Sherman, Police Responses To Family Violence Incidents, 83J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 70, 74 (1988)
[hereinafter Berk & Sherman, Police Responses]; Richard A. Berk et al., When Random Assignment Fails: Some Lessonsfrom the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment, 4 J. QUANTrrATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 209, 209 (1988) [hereinafter Berk et al., When Random Assignment Fails].
2 Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 117, 126 (1989).
3 Richard Lempert, Humility Is a Virtue: On the Publicization of Policy-Relevant Research,
23 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 145, 146 (1989).

Berk & Sherman, Police Responses, supra note 1, at 76.
Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Omaha Domestic Violence Police Experiments: Final Report to the National Institute ofJustice, Technical Report, INST. OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, U. OF
COLORADO (1989).
4
5
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building on unpublished findings from the Milwaukee, Wisconsin
replication, and also weaving in new tabulations from the Omaha
study. We focus especially on the Milwaukee experiment because of
its new and important findings, the credibility of which depends in
part on similar results in at least one other site. 6 To this end, we
employ a Bayesian framework in which priors based on the Milwaukee study can be explicitly introduced into the analysis of data from
Colorado Springs. In other words, we undertake a form of "metaanalysis" across three randomized field experiments. 7 A full "standalone" analysis of the Colorado Springs experiment will be reported
elsewhere.
II.

THE OMAHA REPLICATION

Beginning in early 1986, the Omaha replication began comparing their versions of "arrest," "separation," and "mediation" for
cases of misdemeanor spousal violence. The Omaha authors note,
however, that little effort was made to standardize treatments, and
the information on treatment content is sketchy.8 Three hundred
and twenty seven suspects were assigned to one of the three treatments. Of that total, ninety-seven percent received the treatment to
which they were randomly assigned. Random assignment, therefore, was successfully implemented. 9
Outcome measures were of two types: (1) "official" recidivism
measured by new arrests or officially reported complaints for any
crimes committed by suspects against their original victims, and (2)
victim reports of new incidents including fear of injury, pushing/hitting, and physical injury. The victim report data were collected through face-to-face interviews six months into the study.
The response rate for these interviews was seventy-three percent,
with only slight differences in response rates across treatments. 10
Using a variety of outcome measures, the Omaha authors claim
that no treatment proved more successful than any other. That is,
in no case could the hypothesis of equal "failure" rates across the
three treatments be rejected at conventional statistical confidence
levels. Yet, the Omaha results appear to be within the Minneapolis
6 See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment and Stake in Conformity:
Legal and Extra Legal Control of Domestic Violence (1991) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY) [hereinafter Sherman, Crime, Punishment,
and Stake in Conformity].
7 See LARRY V. HEDGES & INGRAM OLKIN, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR META-ANALYSIS
(1985).
8 See Dunford, supra note 5, at 189-91.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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confidence limits. Just as in the earlier Minneapolis experiment, it is
a bit difficult to confidently interpret the results. For example, if
victims in the separation or mediation treatments were frustrated by
the failure of police officers to arrest their assailants, they might well
be less inclined to report future assaults. After taking the considerable risk of serious retaliation from the suspect by calling the police,
"nothing" happened. This would downwardly bias reports of new
violence in official police records and artificially improve the apparent performance of the mediation and separation treatments. Moreover, there is no discussion of the treatments' possible interaction
effects, the importance of which the following makes clear.
IIl.

THE MILWAUKEE REPLICATION

As described by Sherman and his colleagues, 1 1 between April
1987 and August 1988, the Milwaukee police department randomly
assigned 1,200 suspects charged with misdemeanor spousal battery
to one of three conditions: (1) standard "full" arrest in which the
suspect was held until morning, unless he could post bail; 2) "short"
arrest in which the suspect was released on recognizance within
three hours; and 3) no arrest at all coupled with a scripted warning
of an arrest if the police had to return. Ninety-eight percent of the
suspects received the treatment to which they were randomly
assigned.
While both victim report data and official data were used to
construct outcome measures, the Milwaukee authors have (to date)
focused on the official data, which they felt was far more reliable
than the data extracted from the interviews with victims. The overall failure rates from these data were very similar across all three
treatments, but the two arrest treatments seemed to delay the onset
of new violence by a little more than a month compared to the warning treatment.
Far more important for our purposes were findings that the
arrest treatments reduced both the likelihood (prevalence) and the
number (frequency) of failures (repeat violence) for suspects who
were employed and increased the likelihood and number of failures
for suspects who were not employed. The Milwaukee researchers
anticipated the former result before the data analysis began. Employed individuals would presumably have more to lose through an
arrest, perhaps even their employment itself. According to Social
Control Theory, employed individuals have stronger ties to the local
community and, therefore, are more likely to feel shame after an
1

Sherman, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity, supra note 6.
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arrest for domestic violence. The latter result was explained in a
post hoc fashion. According to Labeling Theory, suspects with little
to lose will not be deterred by an arrest; and if they blame the victim
for it, they may be more likely to retaliate.
However, some grounds exist for caution about the arrest treatments' interaction effects as shown in the researchers' general analysis of the date. A number of interaction effects were examined by
the Milwaukee researchers, and the prospect of capitalizing on
chance exists. Moreover, whatever the average effect across all suspects, if a pool of suspects is divided into two groups, and one
group does better than average, the other group necessarily must
do worse than average. And since for the Milwaukee experiment,
the average effect across all suspects is effectively zero, finding a
beneficial treatment effect for employed suspects requires finding a
harmful effect for unemployed suspects. Put another way, any split
of the Milwaukee subject pool in which arrest appears to have a beneficial effect for one of the two groups necessarily requires finding a
harmful effect for the other group. However, in conventional frequentist terms, one or both effects might not be "statistically significant" because, in part, of small sample sizes.
In summary, in Milwaukee, as in Omaha, there are at most only
weak hints of a main treatment effect for arrest. However, claims
were made of rather substantial interaction effects for arrest depending upon whether the suspect is employed.
IV.

THE COLORADO SPRINGS REPLICATION

Over a period of about two years beginning in June of 1987, the
Colorado Springs Police Department randomly assigned 1,658 suspects of misdemeanor spousal violence to one of four treatments:
(1) an emergency order of protection for the victim coupled with
arrest of the suspect; (2) an emergency order of protection for the
victim coupled with immediate crisis counseling for the suspect; (3)
an emergency order of protection only; or (4) restoring order at the
scene with no emergency order of protection. After police arrived
at the scene and determined that a case was eligible for the experiment, they called the dispatcher to learn what treatment should be
applied. The dispatcher, in turn, consulted a computer which generated the assignment at random. Eighty-two percent of the suspects received the treatment to which they were randomly assigned.
The eighteen percent rate of "misassignment" is comparable to the
rate in Minneapolis and is addressed below. Some of the misassignments had systematic explanations. For example, occasionally a sus-
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pect assigned to the restoring-order intervention refused to
cooperate and had to be arrested.
Follow-up data again were of two kinds: reports of new offenses
in police records and interviews with victims. For the latter, the response rate for the last interview, which took place six months after
entering the study, and from which the victim reported outcome
measures are most easily constructed, was sixty-four percent. The
implications of this is addressed below.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for suspects and victims subject to random assignment. The data in Table 1 were taken
from "implementation forms" filled out at the scene by the police
for every "household" included in the experiment. These data,
therefore, have the fewest number of missing observations of any
data available to us. Subsequent data collection efforts lost cases
through attrition (e.g., the victim and suspect moved from Colorado
Springs).
As anticipated by the research design, virtually all of the victims
and suspects are either married or otherwise "romantically" involved, with roughly two-thirds married. The average age for both
victims and suspects is nearly thirty. Roughly sixty percent of the
victims are white, which is comparable to the mix of victims in Minneapolis and Omaha, but more than double the white percentage in
Milwaukee. The vast majority of victims are female. For thirty percent of the victims, the police recorded no occupation. In addition,
eleven percent are unemployed. The remaining victims are spread
fairly evenly across a number of skilled and unskilled occupations.
The relatively large fraction (seven percent) of victims working in
the military is unusual. There is no significant military representation at any of the other sites, while in and around Colorado Springs
are several military installations, including Fort Carson (Army), and
the U.S. Air Force Academy. Not surprisingly, the suspects have
rather similar backgrounds. Perhaps most distinctive is the very
large percentage (twenty-four percent) of suspects in the military.
No other sites have comparable figures, raising issues to which we
will shortly return.
Table 2 provides information on how the experiment was implemented. For nearly twenty percent of the suspects, the instant
offense was a repeat offense. Consistent with the research design,
when the offense was recorded, it was a misdemeanor. Felonies
were excluded from the research because of ethical and legal issues;
for example, for these more serious offenses, the law required that
an arrest be made. About a quarter were assigned at random to
each of the four treatments. As noted earlier, however, eighteen
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Table 1
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR COLORADO SPRINGS DATA

(N=1658)
Variable

Proportion or Mean

Victim White

.59

Victim Black

.25

Victim Latina/o

.12

Suspect White

.53

Suspect Black

.31

Suspect Latina/o

.14

Victim Female

.89

Suspect Male

.89

Victim Occup. Unskilled

.20

Victim Occup. Skilled

.16

Victim Occup. Professional

.04

Victim in Military

.07

Suspect Occup. Unskilled

.19

Suspect Occup. Skilled

.19

Suspect Occup. Professional

.03

Suspect in Military

.24

Victim's Age

28.7

Suspect's Age

29.7

Couple Married/Living Together

.64

Couple Married/Not Living Together

.04

Couple Friends/Lovers

.28

Prior Domestic Violence by Suspect

.19

percent of the suspects did not receive the treatment to which they
were assigned. The marginals for the imposed treatment indicate
that the major deviation from the design involved the counseling
treatment. Counseling was apparently less frequently delivered
than called for by design, with the other treatments, save emergency
orders of protection alone, being given more often. "Other" included such things as transporting the suspect to an emergency
room for immediate medical care.

COLORADO SPRINGS
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Table 2
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXPERIMENT
Offense Committed

(N=1658)

Proportion

Menacing

.03

Harassment

.54

3rd Degree Assault

.38

False Imprisonment

.03

Other

.02

Treatment Assigned

Proportion

EPO/Arrest

.26

EPO/Counseling

.24

EPO alone

.27

Restore Order

.23

Treatment Imposed

Proportion

EPO/Arrest

.28

EPO/Counseling

.19

EPO alone

.27

Restore Order

.24

Other

.02

EPO = Emergency protection order.

We do not know precisely why there was a shortfall for the
counseling treatment. The difficulty of implementing this treatment
no doubt contributed. It required the police officers to transport
the suspect to another location at which counseling could occur. If
the suspect was seriously intoxicated or impaired by drugs, counseling could not be undertaken.
We have completed some analyses of the fit between the treatment assigned and the treatment imposed, consistent with research
on the Minneapolis experiment.1 2 Just as in the Minneapolis experiment, in Colorado Springs there is some evidence to explain "upgrading" from the counseling, the emergency orders of protection
alone, and the restore order treatments to the arrest treatment.
12 Berk et al., When Random Assignment Fails, supra note 1.
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This could occur, for example, if the suspect refused to cooperate
with efforts to "restore order" and, as a result, was arrested.
Since the suspects who were "upgraded" were sometimes just
those suspects who had a history of spouse abuse, the shift of some
suspects to the arrest treatment from the other treatments could
bias the study against finding any beneficial effects for arrests. We
empirically address these concerns below in the data analysis.
V.

ESTIMATION

This article focuses primarily on the possibility of different
treatment effects for different classes of suspects and, in particular,
on whether the impact of arrest depends on whether the offender is
employed or in the military. We use Bayesian procedures to take
explicit account of two replication studies (Omaha and Milwaukee)
done before the Colorado Springs experiment. The results of those
earlier studies are translated into "prior distributions" of interaction effects. When combined with the results from the Colorado
Springs experiment, that produces "posterior distributions" of interaction effects, which take account of all three replication experiments. In principle, one could simply pool the necessary data, since
we have access to the requisite tabulations for each site. However,
for reasons that will be made more clear below, simple pooling
would, in our view, give too much weight to the Milwaukee results.
We also considered pooling the Minneapolis data, but the necessary tabulations could not be computed from the information
available. Yet, because the Minneapolis sample is small compared
to the sample size for the three replications explored here, including
the Minneapolis data would make little difference in the results. We
also favor Bayesian inference more generally for policy-related work
3
for reasons that are beyond the scope of this article.'
We do not focus on main effects. By "main effects" we mean
average effects across all suspects. Given the potential saliency of
interaction effects, main effects are, in one important sense, not well
defined. They depend in part on the particular mix of the relevant
offender classes. Given certain interaction effects, varying proportions of offenders in the different offender classes could produce
varying main effects. Such variation is of more than academic concern, since the mix of suspects varies greatly across the three sites.
To maximize comparability to past spouse abuse experiments,
we collapse the treatments into two categories: arrest versus every13 But see Vic BARNETr, COMPARATIVE STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1982); WILLIAM E.
POLLARD, BAYESIAN STATISTICS FOR EVALUATION RESEARCH: AN INTRODUCTION (1986).
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thing else. In addition, we also define a failure in ways that maximize comparability. A failure (via the data collected by police) is
defined as a new reported offense by the suspect involving the same
victim; and a failure (via the victim report data) is defined as an incident in which the same suspect either struck or caused injury to the
same victim. In both instances, therefore, a failure is defined as an
incident that would be classified as a crime in most locales.
There are, of course, a number of other ways failure could be
defined. But in order to meaningfully combine the results across
sites, the definitions across sites must be as similar as possible. For
example, Colorado's spousal violence statutes proscribe a wider
range of behavior than Wisconsin's statutes. If one relied solely on
such local definitions, different findings across sites could result
simply from different offense content.
There may also be concern that the use of a yes/no (binary)
definition of failure throws out too much information compared to
the use of survival time. In conventional frequentist terms, however, the only price is a bit of efficiency, and our sample sizes are
already very large. Finally, since very few suspects in Colorado
Springs committed more than one repeat offense during the followup period, using a count of the number of new incidents instead of a
binary variable effectively makes no difference in the results.
Our estimation procedures are taken from a recent article by
Clogg and his colleagues. 14 We have a sample of 1,658 randomly
assigned suspects, and the goal is to determine how failure (Y) varies with the treatment (T). In addition, we have a covariate, employment status (E), which can be used to separate the suspects into
groups so that different effects for the treatment can be examined
for each group. In particular, the E can in principle distinguish between five mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: (1) employed in the civilian labor force; (2) military personnel; (3)
unemployed; (4) other (e.g., student, retired); and (5) employment
status unknown. Building on the Milwaukee experiment, we expect
that an arrest will work better than the other treatments for suspects
who are employed in the civilian labor force or are in the military.
We expect that an arrest will work worse than the other treatments
for suspects who are unemployed or whose occupation is unreported. The prior distributions and their rationales are described
below.
More formally, let Yij denote the value of the (binary) outcome
14 Clifford C. Clogg et al., Multiple Imputation of Industry and Occupation Codes in Census
Public-UseSamples Using Bayesian Logistic Regression, 86J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 68, 68-77 (1991).
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variable (1 = failure, 0=success) for the jth suspect in group i (i =
1..., I; j = 1...., ni), where ni is the number of suspects in the ith
employment status group, and Mini = N. In our application, N is
1,658; and I the number of categories of E, can be up to 5, at least in
principle. In an analogous fashion, let Tij denote the value of the
(binary) treatment variable (1 =arrest, 0=not arrest) for thejth suspect in the ith group. Then, the logistic regression model specifies
that for given 1?, a vector of probabilities of failure, the Yij are independent with Pr(Yij = 1 I T) = zri, and that
(5.1)
where fi = logit~ri) = log[ari/(1 - 'ri)] is the logit transformation of
ari, Xi is the variable Ti appended to a vector of l's (of the same
length), and 13 is a 2 by 1 vector of logistic regression coefficients.
Continuing in the fashion of Clogg and his colleagues, 15 the
likelihood function can be expressed as
i= XJ3

I

L (3 1 fli, foi; i = 1 .... I)

17
i=1

[".(i)]fli[

1

-

1T(f)]

fOi

(5.2)

where "ri(13) is the inverse logit transformation, and f1i is the number
of l's in group i and f 0i is the number of O's in group i. The conjugate prior is of the form
I
P(P)

H

[wr,(p)

g

l'

]

[1

- ir,(f)]go,

(5.3)

i=i

where gii and g0o are positive constants to be specified. Then, the
posterior is
p(1 l fli, foi; i

=

1 .... I)

J1[ir,(13)]

fI,+g.[

1

- tr,(fO)]

fo°+g°o

(5.4)

Equation 5.4 implies that the posterior is essentially the "likelihood" of a dataset that includes not just the original observations
but additional observations representing one's priors. In 2 X 2 table form, for example, new counts are simply added to the counts in
each cell computed initially from the sample data alone.
Clogg and his colleagues incremented their data with cell
counts constructed from a single prior empirical distribution. The
15 Id.

at 75.
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goal was to "shrink" the group means toward the overall (observed)
mean of the sample. Our goal is different; we want to include prior
information about the differential effectiveness of arrest for different
groups of suspects. That is, we need to specify a prior distribution
for each group, represented by appropriate increments to the cell
counts. Moreover, our priors are not drawn from the data on hand
but rather from past research.
A.

CHOICE OF PRIORS

As a practical matter, constructing prior distributions for the
interaction effects first required defining groups of suspects for
whom we anticipated different treatment impacts. Building directly
on the work of Sherman and his colleagues, 16 we divided the total
suspect pool into two groups: good risks and bad risks. The good
risks included suspects who were employed in the civilian labor
force or were in the military. We expected them to be deterred by
an arrest.
The bad risks included people who were unemployed or people
for whom the police recorded no employment information. We
surmised that one of the reasons why no employment information
was recorded on the experiment's implementation forms for a substantial proportion of those cases was that police officers considered
such information beside the point; namely, for example, from what
else was apparent about the suspect, ajob was very unlikely. Moreover, some preliminary analyses undertaken to learn why these data
were missing suggested that the suspects listed as unemployed and
the suspects with no occupations reported looked a lot alike. In any
case, taking the findings of the Milwaukee experiment seriously, we
anticipated that for bad risks, an arrest would actually increase the
likelihood of new family violence because deterrence would fail and
bad risks who were arrested would perhaps be more likely to retaliate against the victim.
Given the good risk/bad risk distinctions, specification and use
of the prior distributions as Clogg and his colleagues suggest meant
that data from Milwaukee and Omaha had to be pooled with the
data from Colorado Springs. To maximize comparability across
sites, the intervention was considered to be the treatment randomly
assigned, and the outcome was the presence or absence of a new
family violence incident recorded in official documents. All of the
sites employed nominally sound randomization procedures, but the
success of random assignment varied across sites. In a similar fash16 Sherman, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity, supra note 6.
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ion, the official data were more comparable across sites than were
the interviews with victims, which varied in sampling design, content
and response rates.
Table 3 shows the interaction effects for each of the three sites,
with treatment as assigned and failure as measured through the official data. The tabulations for Omaha and Milwaukee were kindly
provided by Lawrence Sherman. Note that in all three sites, there is
a tendency for good risks to do better when arrested and bad risks
to do worse. However, some of these treatment effects are very
small. Moreover, in the Colorado Springs data, the interaction effects are determined primarily by the distinction between suspects
in the military and suspects who were otherwise either employed or
unemployed; "good risk" really means being in the military compared to all other employment statuses. Clearly, some overall assessment is necessary.
Proper pooling, however, required two statistical adjustments.
First, we did not take the Milwaukee interaction effects at face value.
Since they were, in part, the result of a data analysis in which several
different interaction effects were considered, we were concerned
about overfitting and capitalizing on chance. Capitalizing on chance
may also occur when several different forms of the response variable
are tried or when various recodings of key variables are examined.
Accordingly, we shifted the estimates of treatment effects towards
zero by cutting them in half. Since our comparison is relative
among treatments rather than absolute, this shift has no effect on
the outcome. No such adjustments were applied to the Omaha data,
since these were data we requested and were the only data we
requested.
Second, we are interested in comparisons of the failure rate for
suspects arrested and suspects not arrested. Consequently, the sitespecific overall rate of failure is effectively a nuisance parameter. By
representing our priors with a constructed dataset based on the Milwaukee and Omaha experiments, the overall failure rate becomes a
very serious nuisance indeed. Since the overall failure rates in Milwaukee and Omaha differed from the overall failure rate in Colorado Springs, and since the fractions of cases assigned to arrest also
differed, combining a Milwaukee-driven 2 X 2 table and an Omahadriven 2 X 2 table with the Colorado Springs 2 X 2 table confounded the failure rate for the different sites with comparisons of
failure rates for the experimentals and controls. In other words, the
pooled data led to an unbalanced design. Suppose, for example,
that Milwaukee had applied only the arrest intervention; there was
no control group. And suppose that Colorado Springs had applied
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Table 3
INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEM RISK AND ARREST BY SITE
Omaha: Risk/Treatment

Failure Proportion

Sample Size

Good Risk/Arrest

.19

53

Good Risk/No Arrest

.28

128

Bad Risk/Arrest

.56

30

Bad Risk/No Arrest

.53

47

Failure Proportion

Sample Size

Good Risk/Arrest

.20

334

Good Risk/No Arrest

.28

163

Bad Risk/Arrest

.28

427

Bad Risk/No Arrest

.26

209

Failure Proportion

Sample Size

Good Risk/Arrest

.19

279

Good Risk/No Arrest

.20

801

Bad Risk/Arrest

.20

142

Bad Risk/NO Arrest

.18

357

Milwaukee: Risk/Treatment

Colorado Springs: Risk Treatment

only the control condition of no arrest; there was no experimental
group. Clearly, any comparisons between the experimentals and
controls would confound site differences in the likelihood of failure
with any treatment effects. Our situation is not so extreme, but the
difficulties are of the same kind.
In order to separate site effects from treatment effects, we constructed the prior 2 X 2 tables forcing the Milwaukee and Omaha
overall failure rates to be the same as the overall failure rate in Colorado Springs. We used the marginal distribution for failures in Colorado Springs when constructing the prior 2 X 2 tables for the
Milwaukee and Omaha experiments. In summary, the prior 2 X 2
tables based on the Milwaukee and Omaha experiments were easily
constructed with four pieces of information: (1) the marginal proportions of successes and failures for the Colorado Springs experiment; (2) the site specific, marginal proportions assigned to the
treatment and control conditions; (3) the overall sample size; and
(4) the difference in failure proportions for the experimentals versus
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the controls for both the good and the bad risks. As an alternative
to applying the marginal distribution of failures (overall) from Colorado Springs to the Omaha and Milwaukee data, one could have
simply included dummy variables for site in pooled analysis. The
results would be virtually identical.
Since some readers may be uneasy with our Bayesian use of
prior information, and since our decision to reduce by one-half the
Milwaukee treatment effects was clearly a judgement call, it is important to explore how sensitive our posterior distributions are to
the Omaha and Milwaukee data. Therefore, we undertook a
number of analyses in which the combined Omaha and Milwaukee
sample size was varied as these data were pooled with the data from
Colorado Springs. Zero was the smallest same size used for the
combined Omaha and Milwaukee data. With that value (N=O), the
results would then depend solely on the Colorado Springs data.
The actual complete combination of the full Omaha data and the
full Milwaukee data was the largest sample size used. With that
value (N=670), the results would then derive from a "full" metaanalysis across sites. Various sample sizes in between were also
used. As shown below, this process permitted us to graph how the
posterior distributions change as the amount of prior information
varies. It also allows readers to evaluate for themselves how our
results vary depending on how much relevant information they believe is contained in the Omaha and Milwaukee experiments. In all
cases, however, the Milwaukee treatment effects (i.e., the difference
between the proportions failing under the experimental and control
conditions) are halved.
VI.

RESULTS

The results are presented in a series of eight graphs. Each
graph plots on the vertical axis the mean odds multiplier of the posterior distribution for the treatment effect of arrest against, on the
horizontal axis, the number of observations of "prior data" added
to the Colorado Springs data. For example, the mean odds multiplier in Figure 1 equals .92 when the Omaha and Milwaukee data on
the good risk suspects are ignored (N=O) and .85 when all the
Omaha and Milwaukee data on the good risk suspects are included
(N=670). Also shown on each graph is the Bayesian 90% confidence region and a "no effect" value for the odds multiplier of 1.0.
We use the mean odds multiplier as the point estimate from the
posterior distribution. The treatment is coded so that arrested = 1
and not arrested = 0. Failure is coded so that a new offense = 1 and
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no new offense = 0. Hence, a treatment odds multiplier of less than
1.0 represents a reduction in new violence for the suspects who
were arrested compared to the suspects who were not arrested. For
good risk suspects, a treatment odds multiplier of less than 1.0 was
anticipated. For the bad risk suspects, a treatment odds multiplier
of greater than 1.0 was anticipated.
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Figures 1 and 2 show the graphed results for the assigned treatment and the official data outcome variable. The far left side of
both graphs shows the mean odds multiplier and ninety percent
Bayesian confidence region without the combined Omaha and Milwaukee prior distribution taken into account; the Colorado Springs
data are analyzed alone. The far right side of both graphs shows the
mean odds multiplier and ninety percent Bayesian confidence region when the combined Omaha and Milwaukee prior distribution is
fully added (but with the interaction effects for Milwaukee still
halved). As one moves from left to right, one can see how the mean
odds multiplier and ninety percent Bayesian confidence region
change as a function of an increasing number of cases from the
Omaha and Milwaukee data are added. In short, the graphs provide
a sensitivity analysis.
From Figure 1, it is clear that the mean odds multiplier is always
less than 1.0; an arrest leads to a reduction in violence. As more of
the Omaha and Milwaukee data are added, the mean odds multiplier
drops from .92 to .85, and the ninety percent Bayesian confidence
region shrinks substantially. A mean odds multiplier of .85 indicates that the odds of new violence are reduced by a multiplier of
.85; that is, the odds of new violence are eighty-five percent of what
they would have been without an arrest. Without the Omaha and
Milwaukee data, the balance of evidence favors arrest, but only moderately. With the Omaha and Milwaukee data fully included, the
balance of evidence strongly favors arrest. In fact, the odds that the
odds multiplier is less than 1.0 are about 10 to 1. This is the rough
equivalent of a significance test in frequentist inference.
From Figure 2, it is clear that the mean odds multiplier is always
greater than 1.0; an arrest leads to an increase in violence. As more
of the Omaha and Milwaukee data are included, however, the mean
odds declines from about 1.2 to about 1.1. A mean odds multiplier
of 1.1 indicates that the odds of new violence are increased by a
multiplier of 1.1; that is, the odds of new violence are one hundred
and ten percent of what they would have been without an arrest,
even as the ninety percent confidence region shrinks. Overall, here
the weight of the evidence for the labeling effect is far from compelling. Indeed, the odds that the odds multiplier is greater than 1.0
are only about 3 to 1. It is also worth mentioning that had we taken
the Milwaukee priors at face value and not discounted them for the
possible capitalization on chance, our results in Figures 1 and 2
would have been somewhat stronger.
Recall that, in order to maximize comparability across sites, we
built our prior Omaha and Milwaukee distributions from the treat-
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ment as assigned and the outcome based on official data. In Figures
1 and 2, those priors were applied to parallel data collected in Colorado Springs. But once we have our "best" priors in hand, they can
be used more broadly. In Figures 3 through 8, we apply those priors to the Colorado Springs data varying whether the treatment analyzed is assigned or imposed and whether the outcome analyzed is
from the official data or the victim-report data. In our judgement,
the "cleanest" story is told from the treatment assigned and the official data; hence the construction of our "best" priors. Nevertheless,
there may be some interest seeing how well our findings hold up in
the weaker ("less clean") data. Such analyses also provide an opportunity to see how the results can differ as a result of problems
with the implementation of the assignment process and the collection of the interview data.
We have already addressed potential problems from the failure
to impose the assigned treatment in eighteen percent of the Colorado cases. 17 Reliance on the follow-up interviews and/or questionnaires can also generate significant sample bias. Since the response
rate was sixty-four percent for the interviews from which an outcome measure could properly be constructed, bias could result if
the attrition from the sample is associated with the treatment assigned and with the outcome variable. We found little evidence of
such an association, but our analyses were necessarily limited to the
characteristics of suspects and victims reported on the experiment's
implementation forms. Recall that these were filled out by the police at the scene, and the forms contain information on virtually all
of the suspects and victims in the experiment. However, the amount
of information collected on each suspect and victim was necessarily
rather limited. It is perhaps important to distinguish between two
kinds of artifacts. First, the estimates of any treatment effects may
be biased because attrition is related to the treatment assigned and
to the outcome. This is conventional sample selection bias. 1 8 We
have no evidence of any sample selection bias as best we could explore it with the data on hand. Second, attrition is unrelated to the
treatment assigned but is related to the outcome. Therefore, estimates of any treatment effects are unbiased, but one must be very
careful in how those treatment effects are generalized (since the
subject pool is not the pool originally selected). We have more to
say about this issue below.
See supra, at section IV.
Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 AM.
Soc. REv. 386, 396 (1983).
17
18
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Equally important, the events captured in official data do not
fully overlap with the events captured in the victim reports. For example, an assault reported by the victim may not be reported to the
police. Conversely, an arrest triggered by a call to the police by a
neighbor might not be properly recalled by the victim. Again, the
key question is whether the errors are related to the treatment assigned. For example, police officers may be less inclined to arrest
an employed suspect. They may define the incident as aberrant or
accidental, or they may not want to risk the suspect's job or standing
in the local community. Consequently, in the follow-up data, the
number of new incidents for employed suspects would be reduced
compared to the number of new incidents for unemployed suspects.
But unless the underreporting for employed suspects was more
common when an arrest intervention had previously been applied,
the estimated treatment effects of arrest would be unaffected. In
short, it would not be surprising if the posterior distributions for the
interaction effects differed depending on the data source, but it is
difficult to anticipate the direction in which any biases would go.
Figures 3 through 5 show results for the good risk suspects. By
and large, the findings are about the same as those seen in Figure 1.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of a deterrent effect comes from Figure 3: imposed arrest and official data. But the basic conclusions
seem to hold despite potential problems with the random assignment and the interview data.
Figures 6 through 8 show the results for the bad risk suspects.
The strongest evidence of the labeling effect comes from Figure 6:
imposed arrest and official data. But Figures 7 and 8 show almost
no support for a labeling effect, once the Milwaukee and Omaha
data are fully included. For the labeling effect, therefore, method
artifacts are very real indeed.
To summarize, the weight of the statistical evidence supports a
beneficial treatment effect for good risk suspects. Because they have
much to lose, arrest may serve as a deterrent. The evidence on bad
risk suspects depends substantially on whether the assigned treatment or the imposed treatment is used and also on the data source
for the outcome variable. One's conclusions are sensitive to variations in how the data are analyzed. While the balance of evidence is
still in the direction of a labeling effect, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions, especially conclusions on which one might choose to
make public policy.
Finally, we turn briefly the main effect of arrest pitted against all
other interventions. This is nothing more than the average treatment effect across sites with the treatment once again defined as the
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treatment randomly assigned and the outcome once again constructed from the official data. In contrast to our earlier analyses,
we are able to include the pioneering Minneapolis results. Note that
there is no need to discount (e.g., in our prior analysis, above) the
Milwaukee data for this main effects analysis. In short, we are doing
nothing more than pooling the data across all four sites. The only
complication is that, once again, one must control for site differences in the average failure rate across treatments.
Table 4 shows the main effect results. It is clear no treatment
effect is apparent when the treatment variable is defined as the treatment that was randomly assigned and when the outcome variable is
constructed from the official data. The odds multiplier is virtually
1.0, and the ninety percent Bayesian confidence region is balanced
around 1.0. The baseline site is Colorado Springs and the baseline
intervention is everything but arrest. Note the large multiplier for
Milwaukee. Had we not controlled for site differences in the average failure rate across treatments, a spurious harmful impact for
arrest would have been found. When the Colorado Springs data are
considered alone, the story is much the same. However, when the
Colorado Springs outcome is constructed from the victim reports
rather than from the official data, a strong treatment effect surfaces;
the odds multiplier for arrest is approximately .65, and the Bayesian
ninety percent confidence region no longer includes 1.0.
Table 4
IMPACT OF ARREST ACROSS SITS

Variable

Odds Multiplier

Lower 90% Bound Upper 90% Bound

Minneapolis

0.92

0.71

1.20

Omaha

0.83

0.64

1.08

Milwaukee

2.29

1.96

2.67

Arrest

0.99

0.85

1.14

Why the results based on the victim report data differ from the
results based on official data is currently being explored. One suspicion, consistent with the data analyses done to date, is that victims
linked to bad risk suspects are more difficult to recontact for followup interviews. For example, they may be more likely to move.
Hence, households with bad risk suspects were lost at a higher rate
than households with good risk suspects. If the arrest is really an
effective deterrent only for the good risk suspects, the greater attrition of the bad risk suspects will lead to an overestimate of the bene-
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ficial impact of arrest, averaged over all suspects for whom interview
follow-up data are available. This serves to underscore the point
that main effects, averaged over all suspects, are not well defined
when there are interaction effects present. In brief, we are not taking the apparent treatment effect seriously.
VII.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The balance of statistical evidence from Omaha, Milwaukee,
and Colorado Springs suggests that arresting suspects in incidents
of spousal violence has a deterrent effect for at least a large and
identifiable subset of "good risk" suspects. There is also a hint that
for the group of "bad risk" suspects there may be a labeling effect:
an arrest can sometimes make things worse. Whether there are deterrent effects on the average across all suspects depends on the relative sizes of the deterrent and labeling effects and on the relative
sizes of the two groups of suspects. These will vary from site to site
and will, therefore, produce different effects averaged over all
suspects.
It is, of course, unreasonable to expect that any spousal violence intervention will produce exactly the same outcome for all suspects, just as it is unreasonable to expect that a given kind of
medication will produce exactly the same outcome in all people who
have a particular disease. Just as there will often be side effects with
medication, there is good reason to expect side effects from interventions in spousal violence. Therefore, one must consider the balance of beneficial and harmful effects, not just upon particular
individuals, but upon the set of individuals for whom a prospective
intervention is relevant. That balance is not addressed in this article
or in any analyses of the Minneapolis replications we have seen to
date.
However, if there really are on balance harmful effects for an
identifiable subset of offenders and their victims, serious ethical
questions are raised. Can one legitimately recommend police practices, even if beneficial in the aggregate, which place identifiable victims at additional risk? While we have no suggestions on the ethical
issues as posed, it may be possible to broaden somewhat the scope
of possible policies to minimize the ethical problems. One might
couple further constraints on high risk offenders who are arrested
that would reduce their likelihood of new violence. For example,
bail could be made much higher, so that far fewer suspects would be
free while awaiting trial. One could seek to make the victim less
vulnerable. For example, victims could be strongly encouraged to
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make use of local shelters for battered women, which might also reduce the risk of retaliation. In short, perhaps a better policy than
simply mandatory arrest for all offenders, regardless of risk category, would be to couple an arrest for high risk offenders with additional measures to protect victims.
Given the many misunderstandings surrounding the interpretation and use of the findings from the Minneapolis Experiment, four
points should be stressed. First, the good risk/bad risk distinction
needs far better conceptual underpinnings and far more direct
measures. If good risks, for example, are suspects who have a lot to
lose from an arrest, we need to understand precisely what those
possible losses are. If the key is psychic costs such as shame or guilt
as opposed to economic costs, such as the possible loss of a job,
these too need to be measured directly. If the mechanisms do not
involve rational choice, we need to measure the manner in which
social integration per se helps establish a psychological environment
in which deterrence can work. In any case, the simple presence or
absence of a job is clearly only a very rough proxy. We have begun
to explore these issues further with the Colorado Springs dataset.
Second, for the good risk/bad risk interactions to be taken seriously, the same story should surface across a number of empirical
measures. In this article, we have only considered a single measure:
employment status. Work is underway that will include a far larger
number of good risk/bad risk indicators.
Third, even if an arrest is more effective than a range of practical alternatives for particular suspects at a given site, it is hardly a
panacea. It is not a cure for domestic problems, violent or otherwise, and it is not the only policy instrument that could be brought
to bear. There is plenty of room for many different kinds of interventions from many different sources.
Fourth, there is never any once-and-for-all answer to any policy
question. As opportunities occur in which social policies may be reexamined, the current balance of scientific evidence needs to be
scrutinized. That balance can (and likely will) change over time with
improvements in scientific understanding and the changing environment into which policies are introduced. With the virtual information vacuum in the middle 1980s about what police should do in
cases of spousal violence, the Minneapolis Experiment was appropriately an important input into the development of useful social
policy. To ignore the Minneapolis results would have meant basing
policy on little more than the habitual practices, with which many
police departments were already deeply dissatisfied. In a similar
fashion, the new findings coming from the replications of the Min-
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neapolis Experiment should also be seriously factored into the
evolving policy discourse. However, no one should expect the findings to be definitive. Definitive findings do not exist in the policy
world.
Is there some sort of policy bottom line? Perhaps most important is that in none of the three replication sites was arrest shown to
be less effective overall than any of the other interventions. Therefore, with monetary costs roughly equal, interventions can be picked
based on legal and moral concerns. We are not legal scholars or
ethicists, but to us, an assault is an assault no matter what the relationships between the parties.
We are more cautious about the interaction effects. The balance of evidence clearly supports a statistical interaction effect between employment status and arrest, at least for employed
offenders. The policy implications of this effect, however, are unclear. Even if there are conceptual classes of "good risks" and "bad
risks," there remains the tricky problem of how police officers can
practically determine which risk class a suspect fits into. Perhaps
once all of the replication data are fully analyzed, more definitive
recommendations will be forthcoming.

